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Abstract— Within the agile paradigm, many software product 
companies create cross-functional product development teams 
that own their product or a defined set of product features.  In 
contrast to development teams operating within a heavily-
disciplined software development process, these product teams 
often require a deeper and, importantly, a collective 
understanding of the product domain to serve as a rich context 
within which to understand the product requirements.  Little is 
known about the factors that support or impede these teams in 
collectively achieving this deep understanding of the product 
domain.  Using Constructivist Grounded Theory method, we 
study individuals and teams across seven software companies 
that create products for a diverse range of markets.  The study 
found that certain organisational and planning process factors 
play a significant role in whether product development teams 
have the potential to collectively develop deep domain 
understanding.  These factors also impact individual and 
development team dynamics.  We identify two essential 
metaphorical dynamics of broadening the lens and blurring 
boundaries that cross-functional product teams employ in order 
to fully embrace product ownership, visioning, and planning 
towards achieving a deep collective domain understanding, 
creating a richer context in which to understand product 
requirements.  We also conclude that the highly specialised 
nature of many organisational models and development 
processes is contraindicated for cross-functional product 
development teams in achieving this deep collective 
understanding and we call for a rethinking of conventional 
organisational and product planning practices for software 
product development. 
Keywords – Requirements validation; Empathy-driven 
development; Product team organisation; Collective sensemaking; 
Constructivist Grounded Theory. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
How well do your software product development teams 
grok the world their products are intended for?  In Robert A. 
Heinlein’s famous 1961 science-fiction novel, Stranger in a 
Strange Land (Heinlein, 1961), Mahmoud explained that to 
“grok means to understand so thoroughly that the observer 
becomes a part of the process being observed” and he 
declared, “I am all that I grok”.  Later, not to ignore a pop 
culture word that was not going away, the Oxford English 
Dictionary defined the verb grok as to “understand 
(something) intuitively or by empathy” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 1989).  This article is about grokking, it is about 
collective grokking, and it is about collective grokking by 
software product development teams of the domain for which 
their products are intended for the purpose of creating a rich 
context within which to understand product requirements and 
develop the software - ‘We are all that we grok’.   
Successful software products are almost always a result of 
creativity, innovation, and vision that are all created and 
maintained throughout the entire product life cycle.  As noted 
by Hoegl and Gemuenden (2001), teamwork quality and the 
success of innovative projects is a measure of cohesion, 
mutual support, and coordination, thus successful software 
products are more likely to be created by strong, healthy, 
cohesive teams than they are by workgroups, simple 
assemblies of talented individuals.  It is clear by observation 
from our long industry experience that strong software 
development teams vary considerably in their ability to 
collectively grok their product’s domain.  If the reasons for 
this variability were better understood, software development 
practitioners could use that knowledge to proactively 
influence the factors at play - factors that impact the success 
of their software product teams, the success of the software 
products, and the success of their companies.   
This study, motivated by our direct industrial experience, 
examines factors that impact software development teams’ 
ability to achieve a deep, collective understanding of the 
product domain (and, hence, the context of the product 
requirements).     
We found that the organisational and product planning 
process models that software product development teams 
operate within have a strong influence on the dynamics of the 
software product development teams and their success at 
Blurring Boundaries towards collectively grokking the 
product domain.  In this article, we discuss the impacts in 
more detail, impacts which often go unnoticed by leaders.  At 
other times, especially when the impacts are negative, they 
become the proverbial ‘elephant in the room’, known but 
deliberately overlooked due to an inability to correct the 
conditions.      
This study also highlights behaviours and dynamics that 
tend to occur within cross-functional product teams in 
response to these organisational and product planning 
process models.   
Early results of this research (Fuller, 2019a) highlighted 
that the organisational model surrounding the cross-
functional development teams (that is, the composition of 
functional departments and the manner in which teams are 
formed) had a significant influence on the teams themselves 
– on the intra-team communication dynamics, on both the 
individual and collective sense of ownership of and 
commitment to the product vision/goals/plans, and on the 
collective capability of the team to deeply understand the 
product domain.   
Furthering those results, we use Charmaz’s  Constructivist 
Grounded Theory method (2014) (described further in 
Chapter 6) to examine a more comprehensive view of the 
dynamics and context of cross-functional product teams 
(CFPTs), including the teams’ role in software product 
visioning and complex planning and in the teams’ interest, 
capability, and efforts to grok the product domain.    
 Our main contribution is our finding that teams that strive 
to collectively grok the product domain tend to be ones that 
have more team cohesion with a clear and broad ownership 
of their product.  This also contributes to the shortfall of 
considerations in the Requirements Engineering discipline of 
the role of human factors.  We also call for a reconsideration 
of the common mechanistic view of organisational structures 
and process models in software product development.   
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 – Background provides an overview of the 
historical background of the topic.  Chapter 3 – Research 
Question and Motivation frames the reason for the research 
and clarifies the question.  Chapter 4 – Research Focus and 
Challenges describes what we are aiming to achieve and a 
brief description of the research scope.  Chapter 5 – Related 
Work positions this study with respect to three related areas 
of research while Chapter 6 – Method of the Research 
overviews the research methodology and activities conducted 
throughout the study.  Chapter 7 – Observations and Analysis 
describes the findings which are discussed further in Chapter 
8 – Discussion, where we provide deeper analysis of the 
observations.  Chapter 9 – Implications for Practice discusses 
the research findings in terms relevant for industrial practice, 
and finally Chapter 10 - Conclusion and Future Work, 
offering thoughts about the research contribution thus far and 
possible directions for future research.  
2. BACKGROUND  
As the 20th century drew to a close, three forces had taken 
hold which dramatically changed the nature and challenge of 
software product development.  Bill Gates has been quoted 
as saying that Microsoft was founded with a vision of “a 
computer on every desk, and in every home”.  The first force 
that we refer to is that vision becoming a reality with the 
computer industry having broken through a 
price/performance threshold for personal computers which 
brought computing capability to almost every desk in the 
workplace and to almost every home.  This created a 
significantly larger and more diverse demand for software.  
The second force was the widespread introduction of 
graphical user-interfaces (GUIs), primarily fueled by the 
Macintosh and Windows operating systems, which 
dramatically enriched the possibilities (and complexities) for 
human-computer interaction (HCI), opening up new 
dimensions for computer user in both the workplace and in 
the home.     
Finally, the third force was the rise of the Internet, which 
allowed for the emergence of totally new business models by 
introducing entirely new possibilities for accessing data and 
for using information technology as we knew it then 
(Wasserman, 2011).    
In addition to these forces increasing the ‘art of the 
possible’ in software (as well as significantly increasing the 
complexity of software design, development, and testing), 
these forces also resulted in more software being developed 
as products for a market (Wasserman, 2011) with potential 
customers instead of software being developed 
predominantly as bespoke solutions for known customers 
(including internal application development).  This latter 
model had been the mainstream context for software 
development prior to these forces taking hold.  This shift 
towards more product software development was significant 
because it alone introduced even more risk and uncertainty 
into the entire software development process.   
This had all the signs of a crisis period and, in response to 
this, a Kuhnian “model revolution” (Kuhn, 2012) emerged 
during this crisis period in the software industry that took a 
new view on change, risk, and uncertainty in software 
development in general and which was critically important 
for software product development.  This new ‘agile’ 
paradigm (Agile Alliance, 2001) accepted that requirements 
(or understanding of market needs) could (and, probably, 
would) change throughout the (now product) development 
life cycle.  Not only would the needs likely change but that 
better and deeper understandings of the requirements would 
emerge throughout the development effort in contrast to more 
disciplined Software Development Life Cycles (SDLC) that 
strived to lock down requirements in the specification and 
planning stages in order to minimise the uncertainty of 
timeframes, costs, and deliverables.  Taking forms of iterative 
and incremental approaches to solution development and 
using cross-functional teams to attempt to ‘discover’ the 
needs throughout the development effort, these approaches 
viewed emergence as a fact of life rather than a failure of the 
requirements elicitation and analysis activities.  “Embrace 
change” wrote Beck (2004) in his seminal book on eXtreme 
Programing (XP). 
This acceptance of uncertainty and emphasis on learning 
throughout the development process, placed a new and 
greater focus on the software development team, recognizing 
that prescriptive processes were insufficient to ensure project 
success in these complex and emergent conditions and that 
the dynamics of the  development team, which was now 
usually cross-functional and often empowered to truly own 
the software product, and the team’s understanding of the 
problem domain was considered a critical success factor in 
delivering software.  The statement from the Agile 
Manifesto, Individuals and interactions over processes and 
tools (Agile Alliance, 2001) rang loud for those adopting this 
new paradigm for software development.   
Out of this paradigm shift emerged an entirely new 
challenge for software development leadership, one that 
many were ill-prepared for, namely, how to lead teams and 
teams-of-teams successfully under these conditions of rapid 
change and uncertainty without a prescriptive development 
methodology to guide them.  
While the agile approaches that emerged improved many 
of the issues that were breaking down during the crisis period, 
they fell silent on the issue of the development team’s 
understanding of the problem domain, choosing to still refer 
figuratively to a ‘customer’, whether one actually existed or 
not.  In this regard, even today, many software product 
organisations still operate as if they are developing for a 
single customer.  And, when they are not, they often anoint 
an internal surrogate (the so-called “customer on-site” of 
XP), an authoritative voice that the development team can 
iteratively interact with to clarify requirements and validate 
results.  These internal roles may hold various titles such as 
Product Owner, Product Manager, Market Analyst, Customer 
Researcher, etc.   
However, as software solutions addresses more complex 
and subtle needs, as software technology continues to become 
increasingly complex, and as software development becomes 
often more product development intended for a whole market 
rather than a single customer, a critical challenge emerges: 
namely how software development teams gain a deep 
understanding of the world for which their product is 
intended, an understanding that cannot be passed on to the 
team by any single voice, much less an internal one.   
Certainly, there are analysis techniques, e.g. from marketing 
and design thinking, to ‘hear’ the market and learn about it.  
These are helpful, however market participants have tacit 
knowledge, as Polyani (2009) states “people know more than 
they can tell,” and they know more than can easily be 
observed.  A form of this problem commonly occurs with the 
popular ‘user story’ technique of communicating end-user 
requirements (Cohn, 2004) when it’s later discovered that the 
story doesn’t reflect an actual need but rather simply an 
articulation of what someone wants, resulting in, “I know 
that’s what I said I wanted but that doesn’t seem to be what I 
need.” -- they know more than they can tell.  Sometimes, they 
can’t even express what they want at all, resulting in IKIWISI 
(I’ll Know It When I See It).  Boehm (2000) described an 
additional form of IKIWISI where the customer initially 
thinks they know what their needs are but their understanding 
of those needs changes over time with continued use. 
In early times, requirements were less complex.  The 
available technology significantly constrained what was 
possible, needs could be more precisely, unambiguously, and 
completely expressed, and quite often the requirements came 
from an identifiable customer, techniques such as having at 
least one domain expert on (or available to) the team were 
often sufficient.  Today, however, with much more technical 
and problem complexity, heterogenous customer targets, 
opaque markets, competitive uncertainties, etc., it is 
insufficient to simply have access to one person with this 
deep understanding.  And it is even less sufficient to have this 
deep understanding residing outside the development team.  
Yet, many software development organisations continue to 
isolate their development teams in this respect, 
communicating requirements to the development team as 
desiderata, and often resulting in requirements fixation 
(Mohanani et al., 2014) and achieving disappointing results.    
Rather, it is important that everyone on the development 
team has a deep domain understanding and it is critical that 
everyone understands it in a compatible and consistent way.  
This is because team members (individually, in sub-teams, 
and across all functional roles) make decisions continually 
throughout product design and development.  Indeed, they 
make decisions continually throughout the entire product life 
cycle, based on their individual understanding of the context 
of the requirements, and much of that context understanding 
is tacit.  This challenge is well expressed by Berry (1995) 
when discussing assumptions in requirements engineering 
amongst team experts: 
“It seems that among experts, a common disease is 
the presence of unstated assumptions. Because they are 
unstated, no one seems to notice them. Worse ... it seems 
that no two people have the same set of assumptions, 
often differing by subtle nuances that are even more tacit 
than the tacit assumptions. It is these assumptions that 
confound attempts to arrive at consensus, particularly 
because none of the players is even consciously aware of 
his or her own assumptions and certainly not of the 
differences between the players’ assumptions” (p.180) 
Thus, it behooves product development teams to strive for 
a deep collective understanding of the context of their 
product, a shared mental model of all the elements of the 
domain, since many decisions made throughout the 
development life cycle will be made unconsciously within the 
team’s understanding of the domain context.  
In other words, it behooves them to grok to the best of their 
ability.  When we use the term grok in this article, we are 
referring to cognitive empathy, coupled with skilled 
perspective-taking.  Specifically, we use the definition of 
cognitive empathy to be “the ability to imaginatively step into 
another domain, understand the perspectives of those in that 
domain, and use that understanding to guide decisions” 
(Krznaric, 2014).  Increasingly, the success of software 
product development teams, indeed of the companies 
themselves, depends on the degree to which the team 
collectively groks not only the product requirements 
themselves but also, and very importantly, the context for 
those product requirements, and then is able to use that 
collective grokking of the requirements and context to guide 
their development decisions. 
 
3. RESEARCH QUESTION AND MOTIVATION 
From our extensive leadership experience in the software 
industry, we observed that cross-functional product teams 
(CFPTs) achieve significantly different degrees of success in 
collectively grokking the product domain, even when they are 
sharing the same organisational, process, and leadership 
environments.  Software development practitioners have no 
theories that help explain why.  Without explanatory models, 
industry leaders are unable to proactively nurture conditions 
and relevant factors to support teams to be as successful in 
this regard as they could be.   
The overall purpose of this qualitative research study is to 
develop a substantive theory that answers the following 
general question:   
“How do cross-functional software product teams 
collectively achieve a deep and shared understanding of 
the product domain?”  
Insights gained from this study will help industry 
practitioners explain why certain prevailing techniques and 
empirical approaches for understanding software solution 
needs are often inadequate, why some succeed while others 
do not.  It is also intended to offer interpretive insights and 
guidance into factors affecting how creativity and innovation 
occurs (or is interfered with) within software product teams.   
Early in this study, it became evident that there were 
differences across participant organisations that were even 
more pronounced than the differences within any given 
participant company, suggesting that there might be broader 
contextual factors at play.  Specifically, we observed (Fuller, 
2019a) that the organisational model surrounding cross-
functional product teams (CFPTs) has a significant impact on 
the team itself, facilitating or impeding the team’s capability 
to grok.  This caused us to expand the scope of the study to 
examine additional factors which were both internal and 
external to the teams.  As a result, we formulated the 
following specific research question:   
RQ: “what factors support or impede cross- functional 
software product teams in collectively achieving a deep 
and shared understanding of the product domain?” 
This article focuses on this specific question, aiming to 
offer insights into factors that support or impede CFPTs in 
collectively grokking, achieving a deep understanding of the 
context of their products.   
 
4. RESEARCH FOCUS AND CHALLENGES 
As the saying goes, “a fish doesn’t know it’s in water”, 
and so the intended users of software products often cannot 
envisage an ideal (or, sometimes, even a conceptually 
different) solution to their needs.  Nor can they often clearly 
communicate the context in which they operate because they 
are trapped in that context.  So, for software development 
teams to understand and define that which they cannot easily 
see, to understand the ‘why’ more than the ‘what’, to 
understand the functionality needs, the supra-functionality 
needs (attributes that satisfy needs beyond the utilitarian 
functional needs, including the emotional and cultural 
relationship between the products and the user), and the 
context of all those needs, it is necessary somehow for the 
team to figuratively become one of the those targeted to use 
the software solution, and to truly learn from that immersion.  
As we noted earlier, it is insufficient to simply have access to 
someone with this deep understanding or to have someone on 
the team that does, the team itself needs to grok, to 
collectively understand so thoroughly that they figuratively 
become part of the process they’re observing (‘We are all that 
we grok’). 
This is difficult.  This is difficult because it involves 
somehow blurring the perceived boundaries between the 
team’s world and the target environment (e.g., a small 
software team and a Fortune 500 marketing department).  It 
is difficult to be an outsider and obtain an insider’s 
perspective and knowledge.  It is also logistically messy.  It 
does not easily fit into established software engineering 
practices nor is it well-supported by traditional software 
engineers’ training.  Considering that software solutions are 
a result of a collaborative cross-functional team effort, this 
difficulty and messiness is even more acute. 
The focus of this research then is practicing software 
product teams in action.  Our interest is in teams with some 
degree of ownership for the product or for a well-defined 
subset of one (i.e., not simply satisfying provided 
specifications).  In our study, we also examined teams that 
are, intentionally or unintentionally, not so empowered.  For 
further contrast, the study included one large software firm 
that develops bespoke solutions.  The study considers 
empirical adaptations these teams made to established 
software engineering practices and methods towards 
furthering their grokking of the context in which their users 
operate, what we refer to as the ‘supra-domain’, the business 
needs, technological, cultural, and political context of the 
product domain.  The research also examines how software 
development individuals and teams, who are trained and 
encouraged to apply their best judgement, suspend those 
judgements and opinions at critical times in order to connect 
with and exercise empathy for the domain for which their 
solution is intended.   
 
5. RELATED WORK 
Prior to commencing the research, we surveyed published 
material in 3 areas: requirements engineering, design science, 
and collective sensemaking, disciplines that we felt held 
some relevance to the research questions.   
This research is primarily related to Requirements 
Engineering (RE), specifically requirement elicitation and 
validation. Reviewing all the papers at the IEEE International 
Requirements Engineering Conference over the past decade, 
as well as many other published papers relating to RE, we 
found growing sentiments expressed about the challenges 
and shortcomings of prevailing approaches to RE (e.g., Schon 
et al., 2017).  These prevailing approaches tend to focus on 
techniques and methods to specify and validate detailed 
requirements more than on deepening the individual 
practitioners’ and their teams’ understanding of the context 
of the requirements. 
There is strong dissatisfaction in the RE field.  Some agile 
development thought-leaders such as Cohn are blunt about it: 
“The idea of eliciting and capturing requirements is wrong.” 
(2004).  While many researchers hold to prevailing views, 
believing that we just need better techniques to improve 
effectiveness, others are echoing the tone of Cohn’s critique, 
suggesting that the notion of requirements itself may be 
counterproductive (e.g. Mohanani et al., 2011; Ralph and 
Mohanani, 2015; Guinan et al., 1998) or even illusory (Ralph, 
2013).  This is reflective that some software product 
development practices still operate in the process-driven 
paradigm and are experiencing what Kuhn (2012) described 
as the incommensurability across paradigms - that is, some 
methods from a process-driven paradigm are not necessarily 
appropriate outside of that paradigm due to differences in 
conceptual frameworks.  While there are certain domains 
where the ‘techniques and methods’ approach is entirely 
adequate and appropriate, the concerns expressed in the 
literature cited and our focus in this study is on the majority 
of product and problem domains that do not lend themselves 
to complete and unambiguous specifications and, therefore, 
where a key success factor is the ability of the cross-
functional product teams (CFPTs) to achieve a deep 
understanding of the product domain beyond just what is 
articulated in the requirements specifications. 
This controversy in the RE field and the inherent 
difficulty in investigating the RE space led to the formation 
in 2012 of the Naming the Pain in Requirements Engineering 
(NaPiRE) initiative (NaPiRE, 2020), a large-scale 
community endeavour run by researchers world-wide which 
periodically surveys current practices and problems of RE 
within industry.  This initiative is partly motivated by the 
view that RE research is not sufficiently driven by problems 
emerging from industry nor is it even sufficiently informed 
about the state of industrial practice in RE.  After several 
open global surveys, NaPiRE cites the most frequently stated 
reason for project failure is incomplete requirements.  This is 
despite the fairly widespread utilisation of clear RE process 
models or artefact templates.  NaPiRE goes on to note that 
“since requirements engineering…is highly human-based, 
we face the challenge to create a solid empirical basis that 
allows for generalisations taking into account the human 
factors that influence the…discipline” (Wagner et al., 2019, 
p.3) leading to the observation that “there is still a lack of 
theories in requirements engineering” (Wagner et al., 2019, 
p.5).  Our research is positioned in this condition of a lack of 
RE theories, incomplete requirements being the main cause 
of project failure, RE being highly driven by human factors, 
specifically an increasing dependence on the development 
team understanding of requirements and their context instead 
of relying on individual understanding that is passed on or 
made available to the development team. 
The design science and design thinking space has 
considerable material regarding empathy-driven design 
(translating human needs to experiences), e.g., (Koppen and 
Meinel, 2012; van Rijn et al., 2011; Postma et al., 2012; 
Woodcock et al., 2018; Dong et al., 2018; Kourprie and 
Visser, 2009; Kolko, 2014).  However, we found these works 
fall short of addressing our research question in three critical 
respects: 1) the focus on the design activity as an early part 
of an essentially sequential product development process 
rather than design as part of an on-going continuous product 
development effort, 2) the tendency to focus on the design 
individual or only the design team rather than the entire 
development team and, 3) even when the design team is 
considered, it tends not to be viewed as a unit regarding its 
empathic capability. Hence, the notion of a collective 
empathic understanding appears to be absent.   
Design science models described by Wieringa (2014) 
acknowledge the challenge that empathy-driven 
requirements understanding attempts to address.  He notes, 
“stakeholders rarely if ever are able to specify requirements” 
(2014, p. 52) and “requirements are not answers to questions 
… they are the results of design choices we make, jointly 
with, or on behalf of, the stakeholders” (p. 52).  Wieringa 
describes a ‘contribution argument’ approach to justify the 
design choices but it falls short of addressing this need of 
deep understanding in the product context due to the ‘project’ 
(as opposed to continual) model.  Also, while the approach 
aims at justifying what was decided, it does not add to the 
understand of what wasn’t decided.  We aim to offer insights 
into this area and, specifically, how to nurture the prerequisite 
conditions for doing so.   
In the organisational sensemaking field, the focus of 
many researchers is mainly on the social process of individual 
identity in successive spheres of membership through 
interactions with others.  Collective sensemaking (the process 
by which people give meaning to their collective 
experiences) does consider the collective (that is, the team) 
but only with respect to its relationship to the organisation, 
not to its collective understanding of an external domain. 
Some researchers, notably Daniel Russell (2009) from a 
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) perspective, look at 
sensemaking for a broader purpose - to collect and organise 
information in order to gain insight, to analyse, to transfer.  
However, although his view establishes sensemaking in a 
collective location (an information world), he describes a 
style of engagement of sensemaking that is essentially 
personal, not collective.  Of interest in this area is the Cynefin 
framework (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003) which is a 
sensemaking framework that is designed to allow shared 
understandings to emerge which could be insightful with 
respect to how teams ingest, socialise, and collectively store 
insights. As with other collective sensemaking models, 
however, it has resonance in early problem-solving stages 
and for formal and finite periods of time whereas our interest 
is on the full product life cycle.  Other researchers (Klein et 
al., 2006; Naumer et al., 2008; Kolko, 2010) elaborate further 
by bringing data-framing into the picture and defining design 
synthesis as a process of sense-making, trying to make sense 
of chaos.  The data-framing activity of sensemaking lends 
itself to being part of a long-term collective effort to 
understand and therefore may have some relevance to future 
research building upon our study.   
 
6. RESEARCH DESIGN: CONSTRUCTIVIST GROUNDED 
THEORY 
As our primary interest is on substantive theory 
generation rather than extending or verifying extant theory, 
we take an interpretive epistemological stance, by adopting 
the Constructivist Grounded Theory qualitative research 
methodology described by Charmaz (2014).  Grounded 
Theory is highly applicable in this type of research because 
the method is explicitly emergent, taking an inductive 
approach where no adequate prior theory exists.  This method 
is well-suited for a “What is going on here?” type of 
qualitative inquiry as this study is and where the insights 
generated will relate to a specific research situation.  The 
Constructivist version of Grounded Theory is especially 
useful in this study because the researchers bring significant 
industry experience to bear and the method embraces and 
manages researcher knowledge and experience as a valuable 
asset rather than a liability to be minimised.   
The Constructivist Grounded Theory method is 
applicable for this study because both the current Agile 
paradigm for software development and our area of interest 
in the discipline of requirements engineering (RE) focuses on 
people and interactions and, as a qualitative research method, 
Grounded Theory allows for the study of complex, multi-
faceted social interactions and behaviour.  The use of 
Grounded Theory in software engineering and computer 
science research has risen significantly since 2005 and 
specifically used successfully to study Agile software 
development teams, e.g. Adolph et al., 2011; Dagenais et al., 
2010; Sedano et al, 2019; Hoda and Noble, 2017; Stol et al., 
2016; Stray et al, 2016.   
6.1  Data collection 
We use theoretical sampling (Charmaz, 2014) where the 
analysis of the data collected prior informs both the selection 
of, and inquiry with, the next participants, allowing the 
sample of participants and questions to purposefully evolve 
as patterns emerge in the data until a theory is reached.  
Individual participants and corporate sites selected were ones 
involved with software product development (teams 
developing software for market as opposed to bespoke 
solutions either for external or internal clients) and that 
claimed to have cross-functional product development teams. 
We purposefully excluded teams involved in developing 
development tools, dev-ops products, etc., as well as 
entertainment or personal productivity products.  The reason 
for this is that it was felt that development team members 
might have a natural understanding of needs in those product 
areas simply by virtue of their professional expertise or social 
experience.  We selected corporate participants that were 
software companies developing products for domains quite 
different than a software development team would naturally 
be expected to deeply understand beforehand.  As our goal 
was to gain a deep understanding and familiarity with groups 
and their collective and individual behaviours, our primary 
data collection methods were observations of team meetings 
and team interactions, documented by thick descriptions and 
reflections soon after the meetings.  We enriched this data 
with semi-structured interviews (recorded and transcribed) 
using open-ended questions to allow real issues to freely 
emerge.  Thus, the method was grounded in the participants’ 
world, with the data interpreted and the emerging and 
evolving theory constructed by the researcher and the 
participants.   
We engaged with seven software firms, carefully recruited 
through our professional networks and via direct outreach to 
select organisations.  Five of these firms produce commercial 
enterprise-class software products, one creates sophisticated 
virtualisation solutions, while another develops large-scale 
aerospace systems as bespoke system development.  Three of 
these firms have adopted agile as a paradigm (i.e., guided by 
agile principles), three approach agile as a structured 
methodology (e.g., “we do SCRUM by the book”), while the 
other employs a highly prescriptive methodology due to the 
bespoke nature of its software development and the dictates 
of its customers.  All firms are major players in their markets.  
The firms range in age from 8 to 50 years and in size from 
thirteen to several thousand employees (see Figure 1.). 
 
  
markets 
served 
 
# 
employees 
age of 
firm 
(years) 
 
dev. process 
model 
1 social media 
marketing 
2,000 12 
agile as a 
methodology 
2 payment 
solutions 
100 25 
agile as a 
methodology 
3 vertical market 
virtualisation 
solutions 
200 17 
agile as a 
methodology 
4 cell therapy lab 
& clinic mgmt 
25 22 
agile as a 
paradigm 
5 
retail 500 21 
agile as a 
paradigm 
6 enterprise skills 
management 
13 8 
agile as a 
paradigm 
7 satellite & 
ground imagery 
3,000 50 
prescriptive 
methodology 
       Figure 1.  Participant companies 
 The study had 18 product development teams and 27 
individuals in a variety of roles formally participate across 
these companies.  The teams were both formally and 
informally observed in action (typically during various forms 
of planning or design sessions) while the individuals 
participated primarily via semi-structured interviews.     
 
# teams 18 
# formal observation sessions 20 
# observation hours (formal + informal) 72 
# individual interviews 27 
senior managers 2 
senior engineers / team leads 8 
intermediate s/w engineers 11 
quality assurance specialist 1 
product managers 5 
        Figure 2.  Participants teams and individuals 
 
In nearly all cases, we hold interviews in the participant's 
workplace to allow for record review to enrich the interview 
data.  Also, having approval from all the organisations 
involved, we are able to locate ourselves as unobtrusively as 
possible in the workplace to also allow for direct, informal 
observation which served as an additional data source to the 
formal observation sessions as a guide to direct further data 
collection and analysis.  The interviews conducted with 
individuals were recorded by prior agreement (which was 
always granted) and later transcribed.  Group interviews were 
always an option as an additional data gathering technique, 
but the need has not arisen.  Group observation sessions are 
documented immediately after in order to capture the 
important details and flavour of the session.   
    6.2  Data analysis 
Given the interpretive nature of this research method, 
extensive memoing was conducted throughout, used as an 
essential analytical and reflexive tool.  Coding of interview 
transcripts and observation session write ups also fed the 
memoing.  First cycle coding techniques were primarily 
descriptive and holistic coding to highlight what was 
interesting and set the ‘noise’ aside.  Second cycle coding 
utilised focussed and theoretical techniques.  The Constant 
Comparative Method (Charmaz, 2014) was used throughout 
the study along with much use of the “pawing” technique 
(Ryan and Bernard, 2003).  
We used the NVivo (2018) software tool to aid in the 
management of the unstructured qualitative data.  Data 
collection stopped once the analysis indicated the 
achievement of theoretical saturation, the point at which 
gathering more data reveals no new properties nor yields any 
further theoretical insights about the emerging grounded 
theory (Charmaz, 2014).  Dey (1999) prefers the term 
“theoretical sufficiency” (p. 257), a term which better fits 
how grounded theory is conducted since the notion of 
theoretical saturation is not a precise moment nor an 
exhaustive finish.  What sometimes initially appears as a new 
insight after further analysis can be seen as a variation on 
existing data, hence the declaration of theoretical saturation 
is a judgement call, a judgement about the sufficiency for the 
research question at hand.  The use of the Grounded Theory 
Method’s ‘theoretical saturation’ technique ensures a certain 
degree of consistency in the analysis.   
We present more details on the results of the analysis in 
the next chapter but, as an example of the many analytic paths 
taken, what follows is a high-level view of how one category 
emerged: 
Interview quote:  (in response to the interviewer’s 
question to a developer about his interactions with UX 
designers on the team)  “…really only to ask detail 
questions that might come up when I’m writing the code.  
But I’m careful not to criticise their designs.  They’re the 
experts, I trust them.”.  Seeing echoes of this sentiment 
in other interviews, we created a concept of showing 
functional deference within the team.  Later, as we saw 
indications of a distinct lack of functional deference in 
some teams, we renamed the concept  functional 
deference within the team with an intent to examine why 
it existed strongly in some teams and was notably absent 
in others.  
We also observed development teams interacting 
with dissimilar functions outside of their team and began 
to see functional deference in a different dimension, e.g., 
Researcher’s observation note from a product road-map 
presentation by product management to the development 
team:  “… a rip-roaring debate between the dev team and 
the PMs about the vision of the product and how it might 
evolve.  Stark contrast with the passive, near silent, 
reception by the dev team at GGG in a meeting with a 
very similar purpose.  This is functional deference (or not, 
in this case) but between teams of different roles rather 
than between roles within a dev team.” 
We then created a category of functional deference 
which had both intra-team and inter-team sub-categories.  
Comparable analytic journeys occurred for other 
categories which were themed and ultimately led to the 
phenomenon of Blurring Boundaries. 
 
Select codes, categories, and concepts from the grounded 
theory analysis are highlighted in the remainder of this article 
as bold italics and bold in quotes where it is an in vivo code 
or quotation. 
Validity and limitations are discussed in Chapter 8 – 
Discussion.     
7. OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
Our RQ called for “what factors support or impede cross-
functional software product teams in collectively achieving a 
deep and shared understanding of the product domain?”  In 
this chapter, we examine the relevant factors arising from our 
data and analysis and do this through the lens of two contexts 
within the firm: the organisational model and the product 
planning process.   In the following chapter we discuss 
themes that emerge.   
The first context is the organisational model within which 
the team resides.  We presented earlier results of this in a 
previous paper (Fuller, 2019a) and we expand upon those 
results in the next subchapter and further place into context 
in Chapter 8 - Discussion, Chapter 9 - Implications for 
Practice, and Chapter 10 - Conclusions and Future Work.   
The other context we highlight is the product planning 
model - the who, what, when, where, and why of the product 
plans.  Specifically, how much CFPTs participate in (and, 
possibly, are responsible for) the core elements of product 
visioning, strategic planning, and roadmapping.   
These contexts are not mutually independent in that the 
model for product planning, and its influence on the CFPT, is 
influenced and shaped by the organisational model but also 
with its own independent dynamics.  Separately and 
collectively, these two models within a company have a 
significant influence on the CFPT’s motivation to grok the 
product domain as the foundation for the teams’ ability to 
deeply understand the product requirements and the context 
of the requirements. 
A.    The Organisational Model Impact 
To facilitate the discussion of the Organisation Model and 
its impact, we will describe two figurative models of teams 
that we use to describe the influences in this model.  
In Figure 3, we describe one end of this team model 
spectrum where functional departments exist in the 
organisation that those departments contribute functional 
specialists to a CFPT.  Within the teams, there is a strong 
recognition of and respect for the functional departments 
outside the team, illustrated by the distinct colour (functional) 
boundaries within the team.  Surrounding the team, there is 
an ambiguous boundary, reflecting the differing mandates of 
the participating functional departments (e.g., server-side 
engineering, product design, mobile development, product 
management, architecture, etc.).  This extreme form of a team 
model is a workgroup, which we have labelled an Assembly 
of Experts team. 
 
 
   Figure 3.  Assembly of Experts Team 
 
In Figure 4, we illustrate a contrasting model at the 
opposite end of the team model spectrum.  In this model there 
are no strong functional home departments for the specialists 
on the team.  The functional distinctions within the team 
soften as the team works together, determined less by 
functional competencies.  There is a very distinct border 
surrounding the team, reflecting an unambiguous team 
mandate.  We have labelled this the True Team model. 
 
    
Figure 4.  True Team 
 
Examining teams in our study against these models, four 
impacts of note were made contrasting these models:   
1. functional deference between different functions in 
the team and the resulting overall team cohesion  
2. primary affiliation of the individual team member 
3. horizon of interest held by individuals on the team, 
for the team as a whole, and the team ownership of 
the product overall    
4. alignment with expectations of the team’s degree of 
product ownership held by senior leadership   
5. individual agenda   
Each of these impacts will be discussed further 
throughout this chapter. 
Note that by deference we are referring to a team or an 
individual showing submission and respect (yielding) to 
another team or individual solely due to the other’s specific 
functional expertise being different than one’s own. 
 
1) Intra-team Deference and Overall Team Cohesion 
Do members on a team contribute as being ‘on the team’ 
or as being ‘an expert in attendance’?  We will start this 
discussion by first looking at Assembly of Experts teams 
(Figure 3). 
When a functional organisational structure exists in the 
software product enterprise, e.g., separate departments 
(sometimes even sub-departments) for software engineering, 
product design, product management, each contributing 
individuals to form CFPTs (see Figure 3), we found that team 
members are more likely to limit their contributions to the 
team to topics directly relating to their particular competency 
and to show marked deference to team members from 
different functions (functional deference) on topics outside 
their area of primary functional expertise.  Although team 
cohesion was influenced by other factors as well, high levels 
of functional deference appeared to weaken the sense of 
cohesion in the team.  In other words, it was more difficult 
for an Assembly of Experts team to feel united towards a 
common purpose. 
This behaviour showed very strongly in our research.  We 
observed 14 teams in companies with a distinct functional 
organisation surrounding them and all 14 displayed very 
strong deference between functions within their teams and 
exhibiting behaviour as Assembly of Experts teams.   
 
Despite a certain ambiguity in this respect, it was clear 
that the individual sense of primary affiliation was stronger 
toward their functional department than it was toward the 
software product team and its mission.  Simply put, an 
individual in this organisational model locates themselves via 
function more than via team membership.   
This was unsurprising since, for the teams that more 
closely resembled the Assembly of Experts team model, there 
is a competing social identity, i.e. the department vs the team.  
We observed that, in circumstances where there could be 
conflict between the two, individuals would often feel safer 
favouring their obligation to their home department.  To do 
otherwise would risk creating inter-departmental tension 
outside of the team and our observations indicated that 
departmental connections were often stronger than team 
connections under these conditions (see Chapter 8 – 
Discussion regarding psychological safety and its role in 
innovation and team grokking).  
In this Assembly of Experts model, the enterprise has 
typically not defined these CFPTs in a manner where an 
individual can resolve broader organisational conflicts 
between the different product functions represented on the 
team.  Many enterprises in our study either did not perceive 
the need to do so or they otherwise concluded that the 
departmental distinctions were there for good reasons that 
overrode this consideration.  We discuss this point further in 
Chapter 9 – Implications for Practice.   
 
 Illustrative comments of functional deference and low 
team cohesion in this team model were frequently heard in 
the verbal language,  For example, when referring to team 
members in other functional roles, we often heard statements 
such as, “I just do my job and they do theirs”, “They’re 
the experts, I trust them”, or “I think someone else is 
looking after that”.  This was very strong ‘us and them’ 
language, illustrating a strong sense of distinction and 
separation between the functions within the team (distinct 
colour boundaries in Figure 3), inhibiting a single sense of 
team and reflecting the divisions represented by the 
functional departmental organisation outside the team.  This 
was also illustrated in the body language where it was 
observed that interactions amongst team members in the 
same functional roles on teams was often notably more open 
and exploratory than the more formal interactions between 
team members in differing functional roles.  Similarly, “I just 
do what I’m asked to do” when referring to involvement 
with the requirements specifications, reflecting a feeling of 
playing a role on the team in contrast with being on the team. 
While the deference dynamics in this model might be 
viewed as institutionalised passivity, we saw no evidence that 
this deference reflected any diminished concern for the 
quality of the work performed.  Rather it was more an acute 
awareness of one’s primary affiliation as well as the horizon 
of interest that individuals had.  We discuss this latter point 
further in the next subchapter. 
 
In contrast, turning now to organisations without a 
functional structure (or at least a weak one) surrounding the 
CFPTs (see Figure 4), we observed product teams with more 
team cohesion with richer intra-team interactions and softer 
(sometimes even an absence of) functional interfaces 
amongst individual team members.  This behaviour presented 
itself strongly - of the 4 teams in companies without a 
functional organisation, 3 displayed almost no evidence of 
functional deference while the 4th displayed so only mildly, 
appearing to reflect a very polite and passive corporate 
culture. 
These teams also had much less interaction with, and 
made less reference to, organisational units outside the team, 
illustrating a stronger sense of self-sufficiency and clarity of 
ownership.  This resulted in markedly less functional 
deference shown on the team and team cohesion being 
notably higher, with individual team members placing the 
interests of the product foremost and above any functional 
differences or tensions within the team 
When we did observe what might seem as deference being 
displayed between functions in these teams, it was usually 
after the team member had fully expressed his/her opinion, 
typically in the form of a brief qualifying statement at the end, 
such as e.g. “however, I’m not a designer” (or developer, 
etc.), acknowledging expertise differences and showing 
respect but not letting the role differences prevent the team 
member from fully expressing what they felt was best for the 
product (team ownership).  Collaborative behaviours were 
higher in these True Team models (Figure 4) and the sense 
that they were all part of the same team (team cohesion) was 
much stronger.  Thus, the language within these teams was 
much more 'we' oriented and less likely to include 
connotations of ‘us’ and ‘them’ when referring to intra-team 
functions.  One of our participant companies has multiple 
products in a well-defined product domain and yet it was 
common that the product team members’ LinkedIn profiles 
showed the product name as the company they work for with 
little or no reference to the real corporation.  They were very 
clear where they belonged and what they were committed to.  
(And they appear to smile more). 
2) Playing the Short or the Long Game – Individual 
and Team horizon of interest and product ownership 
How far into the future do members on the team see 
themselves as team members?  Again, we will start this 
discussion by first looking at Assembly of Experts teams 
(Figure 3). 
Individuals on teams closer to the Assembly of Experts 
model appear to be less invested in the overall success of the 
product and of the team itself.  All 14 teams in companies 
with a distinct functional organisation surrounding the 
CFPTs acted in ways that demonstrated strong focus on the 
near-term roadmap, yet with very little attention given to the 
long-term plans of the product.   
 
We identified two causes for a limited horizon of interest 
for individuals and for teams.  The first, which we discuss 
here, is the influence the organisational model has on CFPTs 
in this regard. The second is the influence of the Product 
Planning Process model and we discuss this in part B of this 
chapter.   
One significant cause for a limited horizon of interest is 
that, when there was a departmental organisational model 
outside the team, individual team members tended to expect 
to be reassigned on a more frequent basis.  This increased 
expectation of mobility appeared to reduce an individual’s 
intrinsic connection to the product team and, therefore, the 
product and the longer-term product roadmap.  If a team 
member expects to be reassigned in the foreseeable future, 
he/she is likely to hold a certain tentativeness to their 
commitment to both the product and the product team and are 
therefore less likely to behave as if they are ‘all-in’.  
Comments heard from team members in this state were 
typified by: “I’m on this team… for now”.  Sometimes this 
condition was created or exacerbated when a Human 
Resources practice was in place that encourages internal 
mobility within the company (usually in an attempt to foster 
alignment, engagement, individual growth opportunities, 
etc.).  A telling quote from an engineering manager in one of 
these situations, “I don’t know how a true ‘team’ can 
emerge this way.”, referring to the shorter perspective 
(horizon of interest) that individual team members showed 
in these conditions and to the increased on-boarding effort 
required by teams as a result.   
When the game was on, team members in the Assembly 
of Experts model tended to take a narrower specialist 
viewpoint on product issues, reflecting their home 
department focus.  This showed as individual team members 
(depending on their functional expertise) being much more 
concerned about how, what OR why a product was to be built 
but rarely all three, showing functional deference to others 
regarding other perspectives, “I just do what I’m asked to 
do” or “I do my job and they do theirs”. 
Thus, these Assembly of Experts teams were generally 
much less inclined to play the long game.  Instead, the focus 
tended towards the current and near-term plans, “we just do 
what the roadmap (or Product Management) says”, since 
both functional deference and a tentative horizon of interest 
undermined a complete commitment to the full product and 
to the product’s long-term development roadmap.   
This appeared to affect detailed development decisions as 
well as we observed, during development discussions and 
decision-making, less consideration paid to elements of the 
long-term product roadmap.   
 
With lower team cohesion and shorter horizon of 
interest, Assembly of Experts teams then were less likely to 
take collective responsibility for the product’s current 
success or failure.  With a (near-term) narrow lens on the 
product plan, they would take ownership for the work they 
performed, but not the overall product result.  They are more 
likely to passively criticise than attempt to understand the 
vision and broader plan - “It isn’t the strategy I would have 
put together” or “I don’t think they understand the 
market very well”.  The strong ‘they’ language indicated 
lack of ownership and/or strongly held opinions coupled with 
a sense of having little control or influence. 
 
In contrast, all 4 teams without a functional organisation 
surrounding them (Figure 4) regularly positioned their 
actions in the context of the longer-term plan and vision of 
the product.  These teams tended to exhibit a more complete 
sense of team ownership for their product and a commitment 
to its longer-term plan (longer team horizon of interest), 
engaging in more comprehensive discussions regarding the 
product requirements (striving to grok).  Using a broader 
lens, they strove to understand the what of the requirements 
specifications to a deeper degree and also attempted to 
understand the why of the requirements as best they could.  
This deeper examination of the context of the requirements is 
behaviour we would expect to reduce the requirements 
fixation that Mohanani et al. (2014) identified that can occur 
as a result of requirements framing and our observations 
support this.  Taking this broader perspective, attempting to 
understand a richer context of the requirements, is behaviour 
that we would expect to move these teams in a favourable 
direction with respect to the widespread cause of project 
failure identified by NaPiRE (Wagner et al., 2019) as being 
incomplete requirements.   
In short, regardless of functional role, members of teams 
in the True Team model tended to develop a more holistic 
and collective perspective of what they were doing (striving 
to grok) and all team members were more likely to care about 
what, why, and how of the product, reflecting a stronger sense 
of (collective) team ownership (“it’s our product”), 
ownership beyond simply their individual contribution to it. 
3) Alignment of Team Ownership of the Product and 
Senior Leadership Expectation  
In addition to teams closer to the Assembly of Experts 
model not focussing further into the future of the product 
roadmap than what is deemed minimally necessary to 
complete current and near-term development, we also 
observed that these teams are less concerned with whether 
they are as self-sufficient as they could be, treating structural 
topics as “management’s problem”.  In other words, a view 
that someone or some group had conscious choices to 
structure things as they were and the team isn’t in a position 
to change those decisions.  Similarly, these teams tend to be 
less concerned about having limited scope due to 
organisational or expertise limitations, putting only modest 
effort into attempting to obtain the necessary skills or 
resources in order to assume a broader scope or plan.  This is 
an example of the aforementioned point about teams in this 
organisational model having less team cohesion and greater 
functional deference being less likely to take collective team 
ownership for the product and work output.  In other words, 
they are more willing to defer to their respective functional 
departmental decisioning regarding resourcing, plans, 
process, etc. than they are to strongly advocate, collectively, 
for what is in the best interest of the overall product.   
 
While this behaviour was constant across our 14 
Assembly of Experts participant teams, we found differences 
in the understanding held by senior leadership.  For 8 of the 
14 teams we observed, senior management was generally 
aware of this (low) level of team ownership but unaware of 
its cause.  For the other 6 teams in this category, there was a 
significant disconnect between the low sense of team 
ownership of the product and roadmap versus what senior 
leadership thought was the case.  
In all examples of the Assembly of Experts teams, senior 
leadership felt they had assembled these CFPTs with 
representatives from various functional departments as an 
expedient way to integrate expertise and to operate across the 
functions in the organisation for the purpose of addressing the 
growing complexity and the need for innovation in a highly 
competitive product world.  However, these teams typically 
behaved as task teams with a short team horizon of interest, 
focussed almost exclusively on the near-term work in front of 
them (“I just do what I’m asked to do”).  In further 
discussions with these senior leaders about our observations, 
they sometimes reacted with surprise, stating that they were 
unaware that these organisational choices would have the 
impact on individuals and teams that they were having.  In a 
few cases, however, the response was a knowing nod, adding 
that the condition and solution was beyond their control.  We 
will discuss this point further in Chapter 9 – Implications for 
Practice. 
 
In contrast, we found that by placing the interest of their 
product foremost (team ownership), True Teams were more 
inclined to advocate for what they felt was in the best interest 
of the product (striving to grok), attaching the team definition 
of success with the success of the product.  As was stated, 
“it’s our product”.  These cases all aligned well with how 
senior leadership expected the teams to behave.  
In an apparent effort to create meaning by collective 
sensemaking, we observed that most teams, of either model, 
have a natural propensity to want to own something and will, 
therefore, define themselves around what they can own.  We 
will come back to this point several times in the remainder of 
this article. 
In summary, these three impacts (team cohesion, horizon 
of interest, and alignment with expectations) illustrate that a 
CFPT’s progression along a spectrum between an Assembly 
of Experts group focussed on the work in front of them and a 
true empowered, cohesive team committed to the long-term 
future of the product is heavily influenced by the broader 
functional organisational structure surrounding the team and, 
if a functional structure exists, how strong those departmental 
distinctions are. 
B.    The Product Planning Model Impact 
The process for product planning also has a significant 
impact on cross-functional product teams (CFPTs).  Our 
primary interest was in how (if at all) CFPTs participated in 
the core elements of product visioning, strategic planning, 
and roadmapping and how much they appeared to own what 
they did participate in. 
 
CFPTs that have stronger internal connections and softer 
functional role deference tend to ask broader questions, be 
more open-minded, show more curiosity, and attempt to 
explore more (striving to grok).  These are all behaviours 
shown by Mitchell et al. (2009) to be essential ingredients for 
creativity and innovation.  Thus, it would be expected that we 
observed those teams having more interest in the broader 
product planning process.    
However, our observations also included teams in some 
environments that did not have the organisational structure 
and/or culture that allowed teams to own as much of (or even 
participate in) the product planning process as much as the 
teams wished they could.  This was most often the case where 
strategic planning for products occurred in a very separate 
functional area, with the plans communicated, in various 
manners, to the product development group to be developed.  
As noted above, we observed that CFPTs want to own 
something and would, therefore, broaden (or narrow) their 
lens on the product development plan to match what they 
were permitted to own.   
We use here a concept of Broadening (and narrowing) 
the Lens as an explanatory metaphor to describe the 
mechanism that CFPTs use to adjust the scope and clarity of 
what they can see of the product domain and what they then 
subsequently focus on.  Broadening the Lens illuminates a 
broader picture, with less detail, exposing control boundaries, 
relationships, and patterns that cannot be seen when the lens 
is more focussed. 
Narrowing the lens tightens the scope, reduces the 
context, and brings detail into focus.  
This action of Broadening the Lens allows the team to 
see a bigger picture and, with that broader understanding, the 
team is then able to more purposefully and knowledgeably 
re-focus (narrowing the lens) to do the work.  These are key 
actions in the team’s collective capability to explore further 
and innovate more.  This mechanism also allows teams to 
make decisions more knowledgeably rather than making safe 
assumptions and creating, what might have been avoidable, 
accidental complexity in the process.      
 The more a team can adjust its lens, the more aligned their 
definition of success can be with what the company expects 
from the team (alignment with expectations).  In the team’s 
attempt to define and honour ownable boundaries, both 
individuals and teams colour within the lines they are given, 
allowed, or are able to create (want to own).  The team sense 
of what their boundaries are is reflected in what completed 
work the development teams takes pride in and celebrates, 
e.g. a successful iteration, meeting a release deadline, getting 
an important feature on the release train, or simply being part 
of a team that created a product that is successful in the 
market.     
 In this context, the potential spectrum that a CFPT is able 
to navigate within ranges from being spoon-fed tasks for 
development on one extreme (“I just do what the story 
says”) to having full team ownership of visioning, strategic 
planning, and execution of the product on the other (“it’s our 
product”).    
 As with the Organisational Model, we found that the 
degree to which a team was able to Broaden the Lens (and 
then narrow it) on their product planning activities also 
appeared in the verbal language used by the teams.  The 
broader the team’s planning scope was, the more we observed 
conversations indicating a deep understanding of (or, at least 
references to) product needs with a product domain 
perspective, product/market opportunities, competitive 
factors, etc. (broadening the lens) and then, with that broader 
perspective as context, discussing more granular detail as 
necessary  (narrowing the lens).  Discussions held by teams 
low on this spectrum referenced domain considerations much 
less with the conversation almost entirely about internal 
entities and artefacts such as stories, requirement 
specifications, other functions/teams, processes, etc.  
 
8. DISCUSSION 
A. Positioning  
   In this chapter, we discuss 3 main themes that emerged in 
our analysis: 1) the metaphor of blurring boundaries for 
CFPTs to develop a richer, collective context for 
understanding product requirements; 2) the contraindication 
of the ‘as machine’ metaphor commonly used in 
organisational and process modelling within software 
companies; and, 3) the importance of human factors in 
requirements engineering. 
1)  Blurring Boundaries 
We noted that cross-functional product teams (CFPTs) 
have a propensity to want to understand as much as they are 
allowed, therefore, it was not surprising to observe teams that 
had little to no functional deference within the team, and 
who were not being spoon-fed their development tasks, 
collectively striving to grok  the product domain as much as 
they were able and, hence, create a richer collective context 
of the product requirements.   
 We also observed that empowered and cohesive CFPTs 
play a longer horizon of interest (they play the long game).  
With less functional deference and less tentativeness of their 
horizon of interest with respect to the individuals’ 
membership on the team, conditions exist that encourage full 
participation and commitment (both individual and 
collective) to the long-term product roadmap (“it’s our 
product”).   
 These two observations - Broadening the Lens towards 
understanding the product domain and Broadening the Lens 
to own the product plan - are important because all software 
is developed in context and it is context that guides decisions 
made throughout the development life cycle.  Decisions made 
by every team member, explicit decisions and tacit ones.  If 
the team is cohesive, their context will be more collective 
than if it is not (Organisational Model).  The more the team 
owns (or is at least heavily involved with) the product 
visioning & planning, its context will be more comprehensive 
than if it does not (Product Planning Process).   
 Both of these factors, the degree of collectiveness and 
comprehensiveness of the team’s contextual understanding, 
contribute to the effectiveness of the team’s efforts to 
collectively grok the product domain, its ability and 
motivation to do so, allowing for a more accurate and 
comprehensive understanding of the context of the product 
requirements. 
 The spectrum of collective domain understanding ranges 
from not asking questions (“just do what the story says”) 
through intellectual domain understanding (learned 
knowledge of vocabulary, workflows, objectives, etc.) and on 
to true felt (as if lived) understanding of the domain.  The 
further a team moves along this spectrum the more the team 
groks.  This striving to grok is a blurring of the boundaries 
between the team and the product domain.   
 In this context of requirements engineering, we suggest 
that empathy, specifically collective cognitive empathy, is a 
fundamentally important ability for the team to possess in 
order to more deeply understand a domain for which the team 
is otherwise unfamiliar.  Exercising that ability to cognitively 
empathise, to figuratively step into that other domain, 
involves a certain temporary softening of the distinction 
between the team as a collective and the product domain 
itself.  This is what we are calling Blurring Boundaries, 
temporarily softening the distinctions in order to more truly 
understand perspectives in another domain.  Broadening the 
Lens is a necessary technique for the team to be able to see 
the other domain and its context, and Blurring the 
Boundaries is an effort to get closer, to deeply understand 
(that is, to grok).  The intergroup theory from Smith et al. 
(2007) suggests that empathy, as an ability inherently 
directed at a different individual/group, can become a 
collective ability and that it can be an attribute of the group 
that is more than just the aggregation of individuals’ 
attributes.  Our observations support that view.  We observed 
that teams that were Blurring Boundaries (striving to grok 
the product domain) were the ones closer to the true team 
model and, the closer they were to that model (i.e., the team 
cohesion they had, with clear and broad ownership), the 
more they seemed to be attempting to blur the boundaries in 
a collective manner.  
 We also observed certain teams appearing to make no 
attempt to grok the product domain at all, a reflection of the 
culture of the team and of the organisation.  These were all 
very strong Assembly of Experts teams.  Certain other teams 
that did try to grok the product domain had modest success 
due to influences from their organisational and/or product 
planning contexts as we discussed in Chapter 7. 
To summarise, for a CFPT to be able to figuratively step 
into another domain and to do so collectively, it is necessary 
for it to see itself as a cohesive unit (team cohesion).  This 
can only be achieved when there is a high level of 
transparency across all functions on the team, with little to no 
functional deference shown within the team, and a strong 
sense of team ownership for the product.  In other words, a 
true team with a strong product mandate – Blurring 
Boundaries with a strong sense of the collective.  It requires 
team members to feel psychologically safe (Edmondson and 
Lei, 2014; Google re:Work, 2020), have open minds, a high 
level of curiosity, and a strong common purpose (Mitchell et 
al., 2009).  If any of these are weak or missing, efforts toward 
discovery, innovation, and collective grokking are all 
inhibited (Reiter-Palmon & Harms, 2017).  
 
 
          Figure 5 - Blurring Boundaries 
2)  “As Machine” models are counterproductive 
Awa (2016) noted that, “[the] functional organisational 
structure works well in a stable environment where business 
strategies are less inclined to need changes or updating” (p. 
1).  However, none of these conditions characterise the 
software products industry which faces continual change, 
change due to fashion, technology, and economics, and where 
competitive forces are often based on innovation and speed 
to market more than they are on lower cost.  
At the team level, studies by Gladstein (2006) and Ancona 
& Caldwell (2008) indicate that contextual factors (e.g., 
organisational structure, resources available, and functional 
mix) have a greater influence on team effectiveness than do 
internal team processes.  We add that the two are not 
unrelated – our results show that the operating context of a 
team has a significant impact on internal team character and 
behaviour including, but not limited to, processes.   
Reiter-Palmon et al. (2012) stated, “results indicate that 
functional diversity is positively related to creativity and 
innovation” (p. 298).  This would appear to support efforts to 
create cross-functional product teams (CFPTs) even in 
companies with an overall functional organisational 
structure.  
With this thought, and exploring Awa’s point further, we 
asked the senior leaders about their intent when forming their 
CFPTs,  whether they were formed as special cases or 
whether creating them indicated that the main development 
activities were no longer well-contained within a functional 
area.  They generally responded that they had simply formed 
CFPTs with an instinctive belief that it would improve both 
innovation and productivity and also that it would simplify 
project management.  On the surface, this looks like a tactic 
to counteract the negative consequences of the functional 
organisational structure.  However, this is very often not what 
they are achieving.   
Although, as we noted earlier, studies have shown that 
team goals which emphasise collaboration, open discussion 
and inclusive team behaviours are critical for team creativity 
and innovation (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2009), Awa (2016) goes 
on to point out that, “[the] challenge of the functional 
structure is the tendency for employees to take a specialist 
viewpoint” (p. 2) (functional deference).   We observed that 
strong functional deference inhibits high-bandwidth 
communication across functional groups within the team (a 
core principle of the Agile paradigm) and segments goal 
setting, thus interfering with team creativity and innovation.  
It also makes the team less collectively intelligent.  Woolley 
et al (2010) found that collective intelligence was positively 
correlated with equal distribution of conversational turn-
taking.   
In short, our results support the view that functional 
diversity has a positive effect if the functions are cohesive 
(i.e., working together as a True Team) as opposed to simply 
working side-by-side (as in the Assembly of Experts style 
teams).  Put another way, functional diversity in action adds 
to creativity and innovation, not simply functional diversity 
in appearance.  Companies with functional organisational 
structures are often not getting the results they hoped for 
when they formed their CFPTs.   
Productivity is also negatively impacted when teams are 
viewed as inorganic ‘Lego blocks’.  Tuckman (1965) 
described a Forming-Storming-Norming-Performing model 
of team development evolution, the implications of which are 
that too much change to team composition while in the 
norming or performing stages of team development places 
backward pressure towards the storming or even the forming 
stages.  With some teams in our study, several factors 
frustrated their efforts to become a team (frequent team 
member reassignment, corporate human resources rotation 
policy, high turnover levels, etc.), resulting in the teams 
spending too little time in the Forming or Storming stages 
compared to time spent in the Performing stage.  Those 
finding themselves perpetually in the Forming or Storming 
states remain an Assembly of Experts workgroup, possibly 
with functional sub-groups inheriting similar traits.  
As organisations scale, whether at the enterprise or 
department level, there is an unconscious tendency towards 
even more specialisation and any divisions and boundaries 
that already exist tend to become even more pronounced and 
hardened.  In the software industry this is often intentional 
since the industry (and the technology space, in general) is 
dominated by analytical minds, minds that build things, and 
the things they build are like machines, machines with 
specialised components that have precisely defined roles.  
Thus, we often see organisational and process models defined 
in software organisations using an as machine industrial 
metaphor, and it appears that sometimes these are created 
without question.  This is not unlike the way that early 
heavily prescriptive SDLCs reflected industrial 
manufacturing metaphors that eventually came to be 
generally considered ill-suited to a rapidly changing and 
increasingly complex software product world.  We argued 
(2019b) that this Organisation as Machine industrial 
metaphor has outlived its appropriateness, particularly as it 
applies to requirements engineering (RE), and we now make 
similar arguments regarding the product planning process 
when implemented in a mechanistic, as a machine, type 
model.  Software products RE, with its multi-layered tacit 
dimensions and other world target, cannot be adequately 
addressed by a mechanistic metaphor. 
 
3)  RE is a Team Sport and Human Factors are Key 
NaPiRE notes that after 40 years of research and practice, 
the discipline of RE still struggles, despite significant 
contributions made over those years in the form of tools, 
methods, and process (Wagner et al. 2019).  As noted earlier, 
NaPiRE surveys indicate that many organisations in industry 
adopt these RE methods and even they still report the most 
common cause of project failure being incomplete 
requirements.  Our results lead us to the conviction that this 
will continue to be true until more attention is given to the 
fundamental issues of how to get tacit knowledge into the 
software product development teams, i.e. how to help those 
teams grok their remote and complex product domains.  This 
cannot be achieved simply by improving requirements 
elicitation and validation approaches that rely on better 
analytical techniques, and more comprehensive templates 
while depending on the completeness and accuracy of the 
‘whisper-game’ like communications along a development 
life cycle process chain.  Until the human factors in RE, 
which NaPiRE acknowledges is a major characteristic of the 
RE discipline (Wagner et al., 2019), receives more attention, 
RE will continue to struggle in the respect of inadequate 
requirements understanding. 
B.  Quality and Validity 
Quality in Constructivist Grounded Theory research is 
assessed in terms of validity and transferability which, 
together, determine some measure of usefulness, supported 
by evidence of credibility, originality, and resonance 
(Charmaz, 2014).   
During the research, we employed various strategies 
(Maxwell, 2012) to mitigate threats to validity, as well as 
taking actions to allow an assessment of the degree of 
transferability of the results.   
First, we have intensive, ongoing involvement with the 
individual and organisational participants.  This extended 
participation also includes the capability to ‘live’ in the 
participants’ workplace, observing and interacting, formally 
and informally.   
It was through this intensive involvement that all data was 
collected and reflections made.  This ensured that the data is 
grounded in the experiences of a large number and range of 
participants and settings, providing us with richer types of 
data, data that is more direct (less dependent on inference).  
This involvement also permits repeated observations and 
interviews as well as a convenient opportunity to re-examine 
and review observations and analysis with participants, 
which helps rule out spurious associations, systematic biases, 
and premature theories.   
Triangulation, data collected from a range of participants 
and settings, further reduces the risk of chance associations 
and systematic biases.  The diversity in participants includes 
a range of corporate types (size, age, markets), teams, and 
types of individuals (experience levels and functional roles).   
We collected and used rich data (transcribed interviews 
and thick, descriptive notetaking of observations) that 
provided a fuller and more revealing picture of what is going 
on.  All interviewees are offered, as part of the standard 
closing of the interview, an opportunity to review the 
transcription once it was complete.  None have chosen to, 
which we take as trust in the interviewer and process.  
However, many expressed a strong interest in seeing the final 
research results when they are made available, expressing a 
keen interest in the topic and the potential usefulness of the 
results - an early hint of resonance. 
Due to the interpretive nature of Constructivist Grounded 
Theory and the role the researcher perspective plays, 
replication of results is inherently difficult.  However, we are 
ensuring auditability by maintaining detailed records of data 
collected from which one can see the general stability of the 
coding over time. 
Participant (and non-participant) checks are conducted 
periodically throughout the study to obtain reactions on both 
the emerging analysis and conclusions drawn.  This offers us 
multiple perspectives on the analysis and it also helps to rule 
out possibilities of misinterpretation.  No feedback has yet 
been received that is contrary to what the results indicate.  
We are assessing the transferability of the results within 
the context of software product development primarily via 
peer reviews (reviews with software product development 
leaders) of the resulting theory.  Later, we intend to draw 
comparisons with non-product software development teams 
to further refine the specificity of transferability claims.  
We have very long and deep professional experience in 
the software product industry and we recognised at the outset 
of this research that this strong positionality shapes our 
objectivity and subjectivity of many aspects of perspective in 
this study.  While we acknowledge the challenges, we 
consider this experience, and the bias it creates, to be an asset 
to this research.  As pointed out in Chapter 6, Constructivist 
Grounded Theory embraces researcher experience as a 
manageable asset to the research.  As Eisner (1998) 
suggested, the expert ability to “see what counts” – the 
sensitivity to tacit elements of the data, meanings, and 
connotations – guides our research, supported fully by the 
collected data, towards questions and insights that matter.  
Simply put, the research team groks the world of the 
participants.  Also, our many years of experience with the 
same types of people that are participants affords us 
considerable comfort, understanding, and rapid rapport with 
the participants which results in dialogue that would have 
been very difficult to achieve by researchers lacking this level 
of industrial experience.   
9. Implications for Practice 
As noted in Chapter 3, a core motivation for this research 
was to create insights that would be helpful to industry 
practitioners managing the entire life cycle of developing and 
managing software products.  In addition to this motivation 
giving rise to the RQ, it also guided our choice of method, 
sampling of participants, and validation of results.  We 
present the following implications of our results for industrial 
practitioners, primarily senior leaders in software product 
companies, in the form of factors to be aware of and 
recommendations to consider with the hope that increasing 
the awareness of the impacts of certain software product 
development leadership practices will help organisations and 
teams move towards achieving a deeper and more collective 
understanding of product requirements.  While some of what 
follows may read as conventional wisdom, we found that 
conventional wisdom and conventional practice are often 
disconnected.     
Implication 1 – Organisational Design 
There is a significant difference between a product team 
member feeling a primary sense of affiliation to a product, 
being part of the product team, bringing their particular 
competencies to that team versus an individual feeling 
primarily affiliated with their functional group or 
department within the company and being assigned to 
bring their skill to a particular team.  What T-shirt would 
your back-end software engineer wear - a functional 
group T-shirt with a specific product badge on it, or 
specific product team T-shirt, possibly with badge 
indicating their primary competency on the team (Fuller, 
2009a)?  While the words may sound subtle the impact is 
significant.    
Recommendation:  eliminate (at least minimise) any 
ambiguity a team member may have regarding primary 
affiliation.  This is important in order to create cohesive 
teams that have minimal intra-team deference across 
functions, higher bandwidth communications, and more 
unified goal setting, all leading to greater creativity and 
innovation.  There are other ways to address knowledge 
management, functional leadership, and career 
development consideration without encouraging 
individual affiliation around their functional expertise. 
Implication 2 – Team Membership 
Changes in team membership are sometimes necessary 
for a variety of reasons (skills adjustment, inter-personal 
considerations, etc.), however unnecessary team 
membership changes come with a price tag.  Having 
individuals and, by extension, the entire team being 
committed to the long-term vision and plan for the 
product is in part dependent upon an expectation that each 
team member is on the team for the long term. 
Recommendation:  make team composition changes only 
when necessary and when the benefit to the team justifies 
the price the team will pay for the change.  
Implication 3 – Team Mandate 
Work groups are content to consume a short-term work 
plan.  Conversely, cohesive and healthy teams want to 
own something for the longer term and these teams will 
define ownable boundaries for themselves if those 
boundaries are not already specified.   
Recommendation:  provide the product development 
teams unambiguous ownership of a product or subset of a 
product.  Define that ownership in as meaningful terms as 
possible, something that the team can feel inspired by and 
feeling proud to own.  
Implication 4 – Collective Grokking of the Product 
Domain 
Cohesive teams also want to deeply understand what they 
own.  If they are not being spoon-fed tasks or having the 
product domain interpreted for them, they will try to 
collectively grok it themselves.   
Recommendation:  expect the product development teams 
to deeply understand the product domain and ensure that 
the teams are aware of this expectation. 
Implication 5 – Team involvement in Product 
Visioning & Planning  
Much is lost when the product development teams do not 
participate in the higher-level product visioning and 
planning, determining the whats and whys behind the 
requirements.  Teams that are less involved in these 
activities, make more assumptions (many of them tacit), 
create more accidental complexity, and take more time.  
In short, run a greater risk that the work product will fail 
to meet the desired outcome.  Additionally, this limited 
involvement results in an erosion of deep ownership.  
Product development teams that do not own (or 
meaningfully participate) in product visioning and 
planning are less likely to take collective responsibility 
for the product success or failure. 
Recommendation:  give the product development teams 
as much ownership as possible for product visioning and 
planning.  At the very least have them deeply involved in 
all key product visioning and planning activities.   
 
9. Conclusions and Future Work 
Conclusions 
Our RQ asked - “what factors support or impede cross- 
functional software product teams in collectively achieving a 
deep and shared understanding of the product domain?”.  
This question is important because the success of software 
products and the software companies themselves is impacted 
by how well software development teams deeply understand 
the context of the product requirements.  Software 
development leaders have no theories to guide them in this 
regard. 
Our results point to two factors that address the RQ.  Both 
the organisational model surrounding the team and the team’s 
role in the product planning model have significant impacts 
on team dynamics, product ownership, time horizon, and 
level of collective grokking of the product domain.  We 
identified blurring boundaries as a basic metaphor to 
describe what teams are doing in their effort to grok, i.e. to 
deeply understand the context of product requirements by 
imaginatively stepping into that other domain.  This 
purposeful blurring occurs, to varying degrees, within the 
teams, between the team and the product planning process, 
and between the team and the product domain. 
Aspects of our results sit in opposition to existing software 
development organisational and process models and views 
commonly found in many technology companies which 
encourage specialisation and clearly defined segregation of 
duties.  This specialisation is intended to support knowledge 
management, ensure specialised functional expertise in 
senior leadership, support career advancement for highly 
specialised roles, provide focus to meet deadlines, and to fit 
with adopted process models.  Many senior leaders in our 
study had an instinctive belief that productivity and 
innovation would be maximised through specialisation, yet 
evidence indicates quite the opposite.  It shows that, for 
software product organisations, both productivity and 
innovation are impeded by these hardened, sharpened, and 
specialised boundaries and methods.   
We conclude that the multi-disciplinary creativity and 
innovation necessary to create software products in a 
complex and uncertain world calls for a rethinking of the 
software product development organisation, a softening of 
distinctions, a blurring of boundaries, the antithesis of a 
mechanistic, as machine, metaphoric view.   
Future Work 
This research shows that a cross-functional product 
team’s ability to blur the boundaries both within the team, 
within the company, and between the team and its product 
domain generally defines the team’s capacity to collectively 
grok.  We saw that, at the very least, this ability is influenced 
by the organisational and product planning process models in 
the company.  However, we acknowledge that there may well 
be additional factors at play that call for further exploration.  
For example, writing this at the midst of the COVID-19 crisis 
and being acutely aware of the topic of working location, it is 
clear that fully co-located vs partially distributed vs fully 
distributed product development teams is a topic that calls for 
examination, specifically as it relates to this research 
question.  
There is also further exploration needed to better 
understand the factors at play regarding a cross-functional 
software product team’s definition of team success.  We 
observed empowered teams being committed to the long-
term success of the product while teams closer to an assembly 
of experts model tended to shrink the boundaries of 
ownership until they had reached a space for which they 
could claim ownership.  It is unclear if this simply reflects a 
difference in ownership scope or if these two team models 
define success using more fundamentally different 
considerations.  
This research raises questions regarding education.  For 
example, how are technically-oriented people (primarily 
millennials) working in teams (typically cross-functional) 
and following a rational process to create software solutions 
able to develop, nurture, and incorporate 'squishier' skills into 
a process that strives to be as rational and deterministic as 
possible?  Are current educational curricula adequate? 
We found evidence that striving to be rational and 
deterministic is an unquestioned given in some firms.  With 
statements from some senior executives in our study that the 
organisational model and inter-departmental mandates were 
beyond their individual influence, it appears that, in many 
organisations, the as a machine metaphor often may be more 
deeply rooted.  De Alencar (2012) found “despite an 
awareness of the need for creativity and innovation for 
organizational success, deep rooted tendencies to maintain 
the status quo prevailed, making it difficult to introduce 
changes in a direction of promising conditions for creativity”.  
With creativity and innovation being imperatives for the 
success of software product companies, this calls for further 
exploration. 
Finally, while we observed teams using the broadening 
the lens mechanism to blur boundaries between the team and 
the product domain, there remains an important and 
challenging question to be answered and that is why, even in 
the same organisational, process, and leadership 
environment, some software product teams observably 
achieve deeper grokking of the product domain than do 
others.  We believe this remains an important area of future 
inquiry for both academia and industry. 
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